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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge J. Dennis Fredrick, entered its final
judgment in this matter on or about February 15, 2005. Plaintiff-Appellant timely filed
her Notice of Appeal on or about March 15, 2005. The Utah Supreme Court transferred
this matter to this Court on or about March 21, 2005. Therefore, the Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED
Under Utah law, is the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action required to present
expert medical testimony when the malpractice arose from the defendant-physician's
failure to remove a foreign object from the plaintiffs surgical site?
Standard of Review
This issue presents a question of law. The trial court's conclusions of law should
be reviewed by this Court de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Further, to
insure that a court acted within its discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's
decisions must fully set forth appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857
P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Findings must be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the
trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based. Id.
Preservation of this Issue
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 127-154).
1

SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does Rule 26(a)(3) require the plaintiff
to a medical malpractice action to identify and designate treating physicians as expert
witnesses when such treating physicians were previously identified and designated in the
plaintiffs Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures and when the treating physicians were not
"retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case"?
Standard of Review
This issue presents a question of law. The trial court's conclusions of law should
be reviewed by this Court de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Further, to
insure that a court acted within its discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's
decisions must fully set forth appropriate findings and conclusions. Barnes v. Barnes, 857
P.2d 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Findings must be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the
trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based. Id.
Preservation of this Issue
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 127-154).
THIRD ISSUE PRESENTED
Under Utah law, does a district court abuse its discretion when it denies a
plaintiffs motion for trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 39, when the plaintiff makes its
motion before any discovery has commenced?
//
//
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Standard of Review
A trial court's refusal to grant or to deny a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39(b) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah
1964); Aspenwood, LLC

v. C.A.T., LLC,

2003 UT App 28, Tf 33, 73 P.3d 947, 954.

Preservation of this Issue
Plaintiff-Appellant preserved this issue below by filing her Motion for Jury Trial
and her Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof. (R. 36-41).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Rule 26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows:
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703,
or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties
as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion;
the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid
for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within
30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdivision
(d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on
the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B),
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
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Rule 26 has been reproduced in its entirety as Exhibit A in the Addendum to Appellant's
Brief, infra.

Rule 39(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows:
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in
Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a
party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have
been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial
by jury of any or all issues.
Rule 39 has been reproduced in its entirety as Exhibit B in the Addendum to Appellant's
Brief, infra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Plaintiff-Appellant June W. Cox Pete ("Mrs. Pete") respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the judgment granted in favor of Defendant Dr. Robert L. Youngblood
("Defendant") in her claim for Defendant's medical malpractice and negligence. (R. 6-7).
Mrs. Pete's claims stem from Defendant's failure to remove surgical gauze from Mrs.
Pete's body. Id. The gauze remained in her body for approximately thirty years, causing
persistent infections and discomfort. (R. 5-6).
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of Court Below
Mrs. Pete filed her Complaint on or about February 6, 2003, against Defendant
and St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 3). Defendant answered the Complaint on or about April 7,
2003, and Mrs. Pete voluntarily dismissed St. Mark's Hospital from the litigation on or
//
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about July 14, 2003 after receiving sufficient statutory authority negating the liability of
St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 10, 26-27).
Prior to the commencement of any discovery proceedings, but more than ten days
after Defendant filed his answer, Mrs. Pete moved, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 39(b), for
a trial by jury. (R. 36-37). Although Mrs. Pete fully intended to demand a jury trial
within ten days of the last responsive pleading to be filed, pursuant to Rule 38, she was
unable to do so because St. Mark's Hospital was dismissed from the suit before it filed a
responsive pleading. (R. 39). On or about October 28, 2003, the district court denied Mrs.
Pete's motion for a trial by jury as follows:
[T]he [cjourt concludes that the Plaintiff waived her right to a jury trial by
failing to file a timely demand in compliance with the provisions of Rule
38, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
sufficient justification to persuade the Court to exercise its discretion
pursuant to Rule 39(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to relieve her of that
waiver.
(R. 62-63). The district court did not, however, identify any way in which Defendant
would be prejudiced, or any other strong or compelling reason to refuse to grant Mrs.
Pete's motion for a trial by jury.
During the discovery process, Mrs. Pete submitted her Initial Disclosures to
Defendant. (R. 60-61). Although Defendant never returned this favor, Mrs. Pete provided
all of the information required by Rule 26(a). See Initial Disclosures, attached as Exhibit
G and incorporated herein by this reference. In her initial disclosures to Defendant, Mrs.
Pete identified at least three doctors—two medical doctors and one dentist—who
provided her with treatment and could offer testimony in this case. Id. Mrs. Pete also

5

provided medical records and billing summaries from these medical providers with her
initial disclosures to Defendant. Unlike Mrs. Pete, Defendant never identified, prior to his
motion for summary judgment, to Mrs. Pete any individual—including himself—who
would offer any expert testimony on his behalf.
After participating in discovery, and after the court-imposed deadline for filing
dispositive motions, Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging only that Mrs.
Pete failed to designate an expert witness. (R. 103, 110-11). Mrs. Pete opposed
Defendant's motion, making the following four arguments: (1) Defendant failed to file
his motion before the deadline set by the district court for filing dispositive motions in
this case; (2) Mrs. Pete properly designated her expert witnesses and provided her expert
witness' reports in her Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures; (3) expert testimony is not required
in the case at hand because it is within the common knowledge and experience of
laypeople that negligence and medical malpractice has occurred where physicians leave
surgical instruments and paraphernalia inside surgical sites; and (4) a plaintiff is not
required to designate her treating physicians as expert witnesses because they are not
specifically retained or employed for the purpose of providing expert testimony. (R. 127,
131-35). However, the district court refused to strike the affidavit of Defendant, in which
he offered expert testimony despite never identifying himself as an expert witness
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3); the district court struck the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating
physician, which was filed in opposition to Defendant's motion, stating that the affidavit
"was not submitted until after the Plaintiff certified this case for trial"; and the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as follows:
6

[BJecause this case requires the presentation of expert testimony and none
has been provided, summary judgment is appropriate. Finally, after
reviewing the record in this matter, the Court is not persuaded the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur has any application.
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike are granted.
(R. 228-29).
Mrs. Pete timely filed her Notice of Appeal, and the Utah Supreme Court
transferred the case to this Court, from which she seeks relief from the judgment of the
district court below.
C. Statement of Facts
Mrs. Pete respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment and order of
the district court below in which that court held (1) that the firmly established doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has no application to this case, (2) that a plaintiffs treating physicians
must be designated as expert witnesses, (3) that the identification of treating physicians as
witnesses in a plaintiffs Initial Disclosures, and the provision of medical records and
billing summaries from such treating physicians, does not adequately identify treating
physicians as expert witnesses, and (4) that Mrs. Pete is not entitled to present her case to
a jury of her peers. (R. 58-59, 62-63, 228-30, 238-40).
The medical malpractice case at hand began at a horse race in 1970. The horse on
which Mrs. Pete was riding suffered a "stroke," causing the large animal to fall. See
Deposition of June W. Cox Pete at 20, attached as Exhibit H and incorporated herein by
this reference. The horse threw Mrs. Pete face first to the ground. Id. As she lay there
helplessly, the horse fell on top of Mrs. Pete, the "saddle horn and candle" hitting her
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shoulder and her head. Id. She lay unconscious on the track for nearly an hour while
emergency medical attention was sought. Id. The small Nevada town in which the race
occurred was ill equipped to handle injuries as severe as those suffered by Mrs. Pete, so
the doctor arranged for Mrs. Pete to be flown to Salt Lake City for treatment. Id. at 21.
Mrs. Pete needed expert medical attention.
At St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City, Mrs. Pete was placed in the care of a
young and inexperienced plastic surgeon—the Defendant. (R. 116). Defendant had only
been admitted to practice medicine in Utah for six short months when he attempted to
repair thejshattered bones in Mrs. Pete's face. (R. 113, 116). Defendant wired together as
many bones as he could and then placed gauze in the surgical site to "provide stability."
(R. 113).
Approximately two weeks after the surgery, Mrs. Pete visited Defendant so that he
could remove the gauze and sutures he had placed during the surgery. (R. 113); see also
Exhibit H at 29-37. Mrs. Pete visited Defendant's office approximately three more times,
where she was examined by the young surgeon. No additional gauze was removed from
her facial tissue during these appointments. Exhibit H at 29-37; (R. 113).
Over the next thirty years, Mrs. Pete suffered from persistent and painful sinus
infections, swelling, and headaches. Id. 38-39. Although she is a hardy rancher who
dislikes taking medication because she would rather know what is happening to her body
than mask the pain, Mrs. Pete visited her family physician and properly took prescribed
medications, hoping her malady could be corrected. Id. at 35, 38-39, 45-54. However, in
November 2001, after a particularly painful and severe infection caused the area below
8

her eye to swell to the size of an egg, Mrs. Pete saw a specialist in St. George, Utah, for
additional treatment and diagnosis. Id. at 45-47, 65-66. Unfortunately the specialist
could not determine the cause of Mrs. Pete's chronic pain, swelling, and infections. Id. at
49-50.
Mrs. Pete's dentist examined her to determine whether her problems stemmed
from her teeth. After finding only normal and healthy teeth, he lanced the infected portion
of her cheek. Id. at 67-70. A large amount of foul-smelling puss oozed from the
puncture. Id. Then, the dentist found the source of Mrs. Pete's chronic infections and
swelling—thirty-year-old gauze buried under Mrs. Pete's facial tissue. Id. An oral
surgeon removed two five-inch pieces of gauze from Mrs. Pete's facial tissue. Id. The
gauze was located at the site of her original 1970 surgery, which was performed by
Defendant. Id. at 55. Mrs. Pete had no other surgery around her face since Defendant
placed gauze in her surgical site. Id. Following the removal of the purulent gauze, Mrs.
Pete has had no recurring symptoms. Id. at 69-70.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court must decide whether a surgeon's negligence in failing to remove
surgical paraphernalia from a patient's facial tissue "speaks for itself." In finding in favor
of Defendant, the court below erred in three ways: First, it is within the common
knowledge and experience of laypeople that a surgeon who leaves gauze in a surgical site
for thirty years has been negligent. Therefore, the court erred in refusing to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at hand. Second, even though no expert testimony
is required to prove negligence under res ipsa loquitur, the district court erred in striking
9

the affidavits of Mrs. Pete's treating doctors. Finally, the court below should have granted
Mrs. Pete's motion for jury trial because it would not have resulted in any prejudice.
First, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at hand. In medical
malpractice cases, a plaintiff may prove her prima facie case of negligence against a
physician without providing any expert testimony if the physician's conduct is an
"affront" to the medical profession, or if the elements of res ipsa loquitur are shown.
Courts in this state, and in other jurisdictions, have held that when a surgeon leaves
behind surgical paraphernalia inside a patient, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
applied because it is within the common knowledge and experience of laypeople that
such a mistake would not happen but for negligence. In the case at hand, Defendant left
surgical gauze in Mrs. Pete's facial tissue, causing thirty years' worth of pain, discomfort,
and infection. Therefore, Defendant was entitled to proceed under a res ipsa loquitur
theory, and the judgment and order of the district court must be reversed.
Second, Mrs. Pete submitted expert testimony, even though not required under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, to oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
court erred in ruling that Mrs. Pete failed to properly designate her experts. Pursuant to
Rule 26(a)(3), a party must identify the witnesses she intends to elicit expert opinions
from and produce a report outlining the bases of the opinions. However, by its terms, the
rule only applies to "a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case," not to treating physicians. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B).
In the case at hand, the affidavits submitted by Mrs. Pete satisfied the
requirements of Rule 26(a)(3) for two reasons: First, the affidavits were from treating
10

physicians, who are not subject to the strictures of Rule 26(a)(3). And second, Mrs. Pete
properly identified her witnesses and provided their notes and records in her initial
disclosures to Defendant. Therefore, the district court erred in striking the affidavits
submitted by Mrs. Pete, and the judgment and order of that court must be reversed.
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Mrs. Pete's
motion for a jury trial. Although granting such motions lies with the discretion of the
court, a motion for jury trial should be granted liberally, unless the opposing party shows
prejudice or some other "strong and compelling" reason.
In the case at hand, Defendant would have suffered no prejudice, and no other
strong or compelling reason existed for denying Mrs. Pete's motion. At the time of her
motion, no discovery had commenced as the litigation was still in its infancy. Further,
Mrs. Pete's failure to demand a jury trial earlier did not result from inadvertence.
Therefore, the court below erred by refusing to grant Mrs. Pete the opportunity to present
her evidence of Defendant's negligence to a jury.
For these reasons, this Court should hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies when a surgeon fails to remove surgical gauze from a patient's facial tissue, that
Mrs. Pete properly submitted expert affidavits in opposition to Defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and that Mrs. Pete is entitled to a trial by jury. Therefore, the
judgment and order of the district court should be reversed, and this case should be
remanded for trial.
//
//
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REQUIRING MRS. PETE TO
PRESENT EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT IS
WITHIN THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF
LAYPEOPLE THAT A SURGEON HAS BEEN NEGLIGENT IF HE
LEAVES A FOREIGN OBJECT IN A PATIENT.
First, Mrs. Pete was improperly required to present expert medical testimony to

show that Defendant breached the standard of care when he left surgical gauze in her
operative site for thirty years. In order to prevail on a medical malpractice claim under
Utah law, a plaintiff must generally prove four elements: "(1) the standard of care (duty),
(2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages." Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'I Med. Or., 791 P.2d 193, 19596 (Utah 1990); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987)). However, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of
care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman." Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352
(Utah 1980).
In holding that expert testimony was required in the case at hand, the district court
erred because laypeople can understand that negligence has occurred when a surgeon
forgets to remove gauze from within a patient's body. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should be applied in such cases, allowing the "finder of fact [to] logically conclude that
an injury was probably caused by negligence." Baczuk v. Salt Lake Reg 7 Med. Or., 2000
UT App 225, If 6, 8 P.3d 1037, 1039 (citing King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858,
862 (Utah 1992)).
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The application of this doctrine "allows a plaintiff to raise an inference of
negligence through circumstantial evidence." Baczuk, 2000 UT App 225, f 6, 8 P.3d at
1039 (citing Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196). To proceed under this doctrine, a plaintiff must
generally establish three elements:
(1) the accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had the defendant used due care;
(2) the agency or instrumentality causing the accident was at the time of the
accident under the exclusive management or control of the defendant;
and
(3) the plaintiffs own use or operation of the agency or instrumentality was
not primarily responsible for the accident.
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting King, 832 P.2d at
861; and citing Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196). A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action,
however, is not required to provide this foundation where "the medical procedure is so
common or the outcome so affronts our notions of medical propriety that expert
testimony is not required to establish what would occur in the ordinary course of events."
Baczuk, 2000 UT App 225, U 7, 8 P.3d at 1039-1040 (quoting Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 353).
Therefore, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court and remand this
matter for trial if (1) the failure to remove gauze strips from a surgical site "affronts our
notions of medical propriety," or (2) the three elements of res ipsa loquitur can be
satisfied by Mrs. Pete.
A.

The Failure to Remove Gauze from a Surgical Site Is an Affront to
Medical Propriety.

First, Mrs. Pete is entitled to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because Defendant's conduct "affronts out notions of medical propriety." Id. The conduct
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of a physician rises to such a level of impropriety when it is within the common
experience and knowledge of a layperson that the injury suffered by the patient "more
probably than not resulted from negligence." Id. f 8, 8 P.3d at 1040. Where a patient
underwent surgery on his fingers and emerged from the surgery with pressure injuries or
bums on his buttocks and nerve damage to his leg, this Court held that "medical
expertise" was not required "to understand the steps that must be taken to avoid such
injuries." Id. ^ 11. Therefore, the court held that the injured patient could properly rely on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of
the negligent physician.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the application of res ipsa loquitur with
respect to a surgeon who left gauze inside his patient in Fredrickson v. Maw, 227 P.2d
772 (Utah 1951), overruled on other grounds by Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah
1978). In that case, a surgeon "carelessly left gauze, dressings, threads, and sutures"
inside the surgical site when performing a tonsillectomy. Id. at 772. After recognizing the
"well-recognized rule holding that when facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of
the senses of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert testimony be produced and
relied upon," the court noted that "actions involving negligence in leaving instruments,
needles, sponges, bandages, gauze or foreign particles in incisions, wounds, or open
cavities" fall into the no-expert-needed rule. Id. at 773. Specifically, the court noted that
if "a surgeon should lose the instrument with which he operates in the incision which he
makes in his patient, it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientific opinion
//
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could throw little light on the subject." Id, (quoting Wharton v. Warner, 135 P. 235, 237
(Wash. 1913)).
Further, where a surgeon lost a needle inside a patient's body while repairing the
patient's rectocele, the court held that no expert testimony was required to prove the
surgeon's negligence. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) ("[EJxpert
testimony should not have been required to establish the professional standard of care
under the facts of the present case."). Specifically, the court ruled that "expert testimony
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of
the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman."
Id. The court also noted that "[t]he loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in
the operating site, exemplifies [the] type of treatment" where no expert testimony was
required. Id.
In the case at hand, Defendant's conduct was an affront to medical propriety, and
the court below, therefore, erred in refusing to consider Defendant's negligence under a
res ipsa loquitur theory. Defendant left surgical paraphernalia inside Mrs. Pete's facial
tissue after performing surgery on her. By common knowledge, experience, and plain
common sense, laypeople generally know that where a surgeon forgets or fails to remove
surgical paraphernalia from a surgical site, the surgeon has negligently failed to satisfy
his standard of care. The district court failed to consider the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
and the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
//
//
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B.

Defendant's Negligence Speaks for Itself and Satisfies the Elements for
the Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Second, even if Mrs. Pete is not entitled to the application of res ipsa loquitur
because Defendant's conduct was an "affront" to medical propriety, the doctrine should
be applied because each of its elements has been met. The assertion of a claim under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur generally requires that the following three elements be
shown: (1) that the injury would not have ordinarily occurred in the absence of
negligence; (2) that the instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive control
of the defendant; and (3) that the plaintiffs use of the instrumentality, if any, did not
cause the injury. See, e.g., Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327; King, 832 P.2d at 861; Dalley, 791
P.2d at 196. Because each of these elements has been satisfied in the case at hand, Mrs.
Pete is entitled to proceed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
As was mentioned supra, Utah courts have consistently held that where a
physician leaves surgical paraphernalia imbedded within their patients, such injured
patients are entitled to proceed on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g., Fredrickson,
227 P.2d at 772 (holding the doctrine applicable where a surgeon failed to remove gauze
from a surgical site); Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352 (holding that "[t]he loss of a surgical
instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies [the] type of
treatment" where no expert testimony was required").
In the case at hand, Defendant left surgical paraphernalia, in the form of surgical
gauze, in the operative site in 1970, and Mrs. Pete suffered damages as the direct and
proximate result. Utah law is clear that when a surgeon leaves behind a foreign object in
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a surgical site, no expert testimony is necessary with regard to the standard of care. It is
well within the common knowledge and experience of laypeople that a physician failing
to remove gauze, or other surgical paraphernalia, from a surgical site, has breached the
applicable standard of care. The Defendant had exclusive control over the gauze, and
Mrs. Pete never had any other facial or mouth surgery during which gauze could have
been left in her facial tissue. Exhibit H at 55. Finally, as Mrs. Pete was unconscious
during the surgery in which Defendant placed the gauze in the surgical site, she can have
no responsibility for Defendant's negligence. Therefore, the district court erred in
requiring Mrs. Pete to produce expert testimony, and the judgment of the court below
should be reversed.
Courts in other American jurisdictions concur with this result. For instance, where
a surgeon left a laparotomy sponge in a patient's body following her hysterectomy, the
court applied res ipsa loquitur, holding that "[a] layman can understand, without expert
testimony, that the unauthorized or unexplained leaving of an object inside a patient is
negligence." Coleman v. Rice, 706 So. 2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997). Further, where another
doctor left a surgical sponge inside his patient, the court noted that "[t]he jury could infer
negligence without any further showing, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, because
the event complained of is clearly one which 'ordinarily would not happen in the absence
of negligence.'" Burke v. Wash. Hosp. Or., 475 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting
//
//
//
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Raza v. Sullivan, 432 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and citing Quick v. Thurston, 290
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).1
Finally, the district court erred in requiring Mrs. Pete to provide expert testimony
regarding Defendant's negligence because expert testimony in the case at hand is
probably improper under the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Rule 702 only allows
"a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"
to present testimonial evidence of her opinions "[i]f scientific, technical, or other

1

See also, e.g.,Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, (E.D. Vir. 1960) (holding that,
where a physician left a surgical sponge inside a patient, "[a] clearer case for the
application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] in an action for medical malpractice
cannot be shown"); Mitchell v. Baylor Univ. Med. Or., 109 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2003) ("Although res ipsa loquitur is generally inapplicable to malpractice cases, an
exception is recognized when the nature of the alleged malpractice and injuries are
plainly within the common knowledge of laymen, requiring no expert testimony, such as
negligence in leaving surgical instruments or sponges within the body.") (citing Haddock
v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1990)); Tice v. Hall, 303 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action was entitled to rely on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to show that a surgeon, who failed to remove a surgical
sponge from the patient's body, breached the applicable standard of care), affd 313
S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1984); Wells v. Woman's Hosp. Found., 286 So. 2d 439, 442 (La. Ct.
App. 1974) (applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply where a physician failed
to remove gauze from a surgical site); Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 212 N.W.2d 361,
365-66 (Minn. 1973) (same); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Ky. 1956) (applying
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a case in which a dentist failed to remove a small
portion of a tooth he extracted from a patient, and noting that "this court has held that
leaving a gauze pad within the body of the patient is negligence per se and the fact that
good surgeons sometimes do so is no excuse, because every man is responsible for the
legal consequences of his own careless act") (citing BarnetVs Adm V v. Brand, 111 S.W.
461 (Ky. 1915); Samuels v. Willis, 118 S.W. 339 (Ky. 1909)); Shearin v. Lloyd, 98
S.E.2d 508, 511 (N.C. 1957) ("It has been established by this Court, and generally, that
the leaving of such a foreign substance in the patient's body at the conclusion of an
operation 'is so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence.'")
(quoting Mitchell v. Saunders, 13 S.E.2d 242, 246 (N.C. 1941); and citing Buckner v.
Wheeldon, 33 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. 1945); Pendergraft v. Royster, 166 S.E. 285 (N.C.
1932)).
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier off act to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702; see also John W. Strong, et aL, eds.,
McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 23 (Fifth ed. 1999) (noting that, in order to allow an
expert witness to testify as to an inference, "the inference must be so distinctively related
to a science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of lay persons");
Glen Weissenberger & James J. Duane, Federal Rules of Evidence: Rules, Legislative
History, Commentary and Authority § 702.3, at 361 (2002) (noting that, with respect to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "the test for the use of expert testimony requires that the
trier of fact be aided by the expert's testimony"). A layperson can easily understand that a
surgeon leaving gauze inside a patient's facial tissue is negligent. Therefore, expert
testimony should not have been required in the case at hand, and the judgment of the
court below shoulcl be reversed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY PROFFERED BY MRS. PETE.
Second, even if expert medical testimony is required in the case at hand, this Court

should reverse the judgment of the court below because Mrs. Pete properly proffered
expert medical testimony in her defense. Specifically, the district court's refusal to
consider the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician was improper in at least two
respects: First, a physician who provides medical treatment to a plaintiff for the injuries
of which she is complaining falls outside the scope of Rule 26(a)(3)(B). And second,
Mrs. Pete complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(3) by identifying her treating
//
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physician and by providing medical records, reports, and billing statements from her
treating physician.
A.

Mrs. Pete Employed Her Treating Physician to Diagnose and Treat Her
Symptoms, Not to Provide Expert Testimony.

The district court erred when it treated "hired gun" expert witnesses, who are
"specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case," in the same manner as
treating physicians, doctors who are hired by patients concerned with receiving medical
treatment, not for specific use as a witness in a nonexistent and uncontemplated court
proceeding.
Where a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action introduced the affidavit of his
treating physician in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the affidavit should be considered. Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999
UT 71, f 12, 982 P.2d 565, 570. Even though the treating physician was not designated
by name as an expert witness by the plaintiff, the court noted that by indicating that any
of the plaintiffs treating physicians could be called as expert witnesses, the defendant
was put on notice that the testimony of the treating physician could be elicited at trial or
in defense of a motion for summary judgment. Id.
The affidavit of the treating physician offered by Mrs. Pete should not have been
excluded because treating physicians are not of the same class of witness as experts
specially retained to provide testimony at trial. Therefore, because the district court erred
in striking the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician, this Court should reverse the
judgment and order of the district court.
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B.

Mrs. Pete Identified Her Expert Witnesses and Provided Defendant
With their Reports in Her Initial Disclosures.

Even if the district court committed no error in holding that a treating physician is
an expert witness subject to Rule 26(a)(3)(B), that court erred when it concluded that
Mrs. Pete failed to comply with the requirements of the rule. Rule 26(a)(3) essentially
requires two things of parties intending to rely on expert testimony: (1) the party must
identify the witness; and (2) the party must produce a report outlining the basis of the
expert's opinion. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A)-(B). Because Mrs. Pete satisfied each of
these requirements in her initial disclosures to the Defendant, the judgment of the court
below should be reversed.
First, Mrs. Pete identified her treating physicians to Defendant in her initial
disclosures. The Rules do not prohibit a party from identifying her expert witnesses
during her initial disclosures to the opposing party. While the rule requires that these
expert witness disclosures must "be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact
discovery," the rules do not prohibit such disclosures from being made at any earlier
point in litigation. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(C). In the case at hand, Mrs. Pete identified
her treating physicians in her initial disclosures to Defendant. Therefore, she complied
with Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and the district court's order striking the expert affidavit and
judgment must be reversed.
Second, Mrs. Pete's treating physicians are not required to submit expert reports
pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(B). That requirement only applies to witnesses who are
"specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case." Utah R. Civ. P.
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26(a)(3)(B). Although a Defendant must be put on notice as to the bases of a hired gun
expert through a report, a treating physician keeps notes and records as to his opinions in
documents contemporaneous to treatment. Therefore, no expert report is required in the
case at hand.
One court held, dealing with the federal counterpart to the Utah Rule 26(a)(3), that
treating physicians are generally exempt from the written report requirement of the rules
"because the treating physician prepares contemporaneous notes documenting his
observations, findings and treatment regime." Strozier v. United States Postal Serv., No.
Civ. A04CV00074MSKCBS, 2005 WL 2141709, *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2005) (slip
copy) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
("a treating physician . . . can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any
requirement for a written report); Sprague v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D. 78, 81
(D.N.H. 1998) (noting that, under the majority rule, an expert witness report is not
required from a treating physician testifying as to opinions developed in treatment of a
patient)). Therefore, Mrs. Pete's treating physician was not required to submit a report
outlining his expert opinions.
However, even if Mrs. Pete is required to submit an expert report to Defendant,
Mrs. Pete satisfied this requirement by forwarding the notes and records kept by her
treating physicians. Therefore, the district court erred in striking Mrs. Pete's expert
affidavit.
Although one Utah court has noted that the affidavit of an expert witness may be
stricken by the trial court if the expert was not identified by the court-set deadlines
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pursuant to Rule 16, this case should be distinguished for two reasons. See Arnold v.
Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1993). First, the plaintiff in that case never identified
the witness to the defendant, and second, the physician involved was not a treating
physician but was hired specifically to testify at trial. Id. In the case at hand, however,
Mrs. Pete identified her expert in her initial disclosures to Defendant. Further, as a
treating physician, Mrs. Pete's expert was not "retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). Therefore, the court below erred in
striking the affidavit of Mrs. Pete's treating physician, and the order and judgment of the
court below should be reversed.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
MRS. PETE'S REQUEST FOR A JURY BECAUSE DEFENDANT
WOULD HAVE SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE.

Finally, this Court should reverse the refusal of the court below to allow Mrs. Pete
to present her case to a jury of her peers. Utah law allows a court to grant a motion for
jury trial, even if the jury was not demanded in a timely manner. Utah R. Civ. P. 39(b);
see also U.S. Const, amend. VII (preserving the right to jury trial in civil suits). An
examination of cases ruling on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper in the case
at hand because "the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205, 207 (Utah 1953),
although the decision whether or not to grant a motion for jury trial is discretionary.
James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 390 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1964).
One federal case, arising out of the District of Utah, is instructive in the case at
hand. The court examined case law out of the Tenth Circuit in determining whether to
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grant a plaintiffs motion for trial by jury when the plaintiff waived its right to a jury trial
"due to inadvertence." Megadyne Med. Prods, v. Aaron Med. Indus., 170 F.R.D. 28, 28
(D. Utah 1996). This examination led the court to conclude that (1) "absent strong and
compelling reasons to the contrary a district court should exercise its discretion under
Rule 39(b) and grant a jury trial," id. (quoting AMF Turboscope Inc. v. Cunningham, 352
F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1965)), and (2) in order to overcome a motion for jury trial, a
defendant "must show more prejudice beyond a change in the nature of the fact finder."
Id. (citing Figueroa v. Pratt Hotel Corp., 158 F.R.D. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)); see also
Green Const. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a defendant claiming that a case was too complex for presentation to a jury
was not sufficient reason to deny a motion for jury trial). Because the defendant failed to
show prejudice, or any other "strong and compelling reason," the Megadyne court
granted the plaintiffs motion for jury trial. Megadyne, 170 F.R.D. at 29.
In the case at hand, no prejudice, or other "strong and compelling reason" exists
for the district court's denial of Mrs. Pete's motion for trial by jury. Mrs. Pete filed her
motion prior to the initiation of any discovery proceedings. In fact, the only actions to
occur in the case prior to Mrs. Pete's filing of her motion for jury trial, were the filing of
the complaint, the filing of Defendant's answer, the return of summons, and the voluntary
dismissal of St. Mark's Hospital. (R. 1-27). Even though approximately five months had
elapsed from the filing of the complaint to Mrs. Pete's motion for jury trial, the case was
still in a very early preliminary stage of litigation, and no prejudice would have resulted
from granting Mrs. Pete her jury trial.
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Further, Mrs. Pete did not fail to request a jury in a timely manner, pursuant to
Rule 38, as the result of her inadvertence. Instead, she intended to timely file her jury
demand within ten days after the last responsive pleading was filed. However, because St.
Mark's Hospital was able to show sufficient authority, indicating that it could not be held
liable for Mrs. Pete's injuries, she dismissed St Mark's from the suit. Therefore, her jury
demand was not timely under Rule 38, although it would have been had St. Mark's not
been dismissed. Because Mrs. Pete's failure to timely request a jury was not merely the
result of inadvertence, and because there is no "strong" or "compelling" reason to deny
Mrs. Pete's request for a jury trial, this Court should reverse the order of the court below
and should remand this case for trial by jury.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in at least three respects: Pursuant to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, Mrs. Pete was not required to submit expert testimony to prove that
Defendant was negligent in failing to remove gauze that he inserted into Mrs. Pete's
facial tissue. Further, the expert affidavits Mrs. Pete submitted in support of her case
should have been considered because she complied with Rule 26(a)(3). Finally, Mrs. Pete
is entitled to present her evidence to a jury because no prejudice would result from such a
trial and her failure to file a timely jury demand was not due to mere inadvertence.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Mrs. Pete respectfully requests that the judgment
and order of the district court be reversed and that this matter be remanded for trial.
//
//
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